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Radioactive Waste: Gaps in the Regulatory
System
By HELENE LINKER*
ROGER BEERS**
TERRY LASH***

Radioactive wastes are among the most toxic substances
known to man. They are produced throughout the nuclear fuel
"cycle" - the chain of activities associated with the operation
of nuclear power reactors, commencing with the mining of uranium ore and extending through the disposal of the radioactive
waste products inevitably generated by those reactors. The release of radioactive wastes into the environment could cause
immediate death, cancer, or genetic mutations in catastrophic
proportions. Because some of these wastes remain dangerous
for tens, and even hundreds, of thousands of years (depending
on the particular waste product), they must be isolated from
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the biosphere for unprecedented periods of time to avoid harmful exposure to humans.
The need for stringent regulation of these hazardous waste
products by an independent agency with technical expertise
has been well recognized by Congress. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), the federal agency with primary regulatory responsibility over radioactive wastes generated by commercial (as opposed to military) nuclear operations, was created for this explicit purpose.' Congress delegated broad authority to the NRC, applicable at every facet of the commercial
nuclear fuel cycle, to ensure that the generation, management,
and disposal of these radioactive wastes do not jeopardize public health and safety. The comprehensive regulatory scheme
was established by both the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA),
as amended by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA)'
and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).'
Despite the need for stringent control and the NRC's statutory obligation to exercise that control, at each of the major
steps in the nuclear fuel cycle - the mining and milling of
uranium, the use of the fuels in nuclear reactors, and the stor1. Initially, responsibility for both the regulation and development of nuclear
power was vested in the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). However, conflicts arose
when this single agency was responsible for these dual aspects of nuclear power. As a
result, in 1974, pursuant to section 104 of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42
U.S.C. § 5814 (1976), the AEC was abolished and its functions split between the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the NRC. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5814, 5841 (1976). ERDA was given responsibility for research and development
programs related to nuclear activities, as well as for building and operating radioactive
waste repositories. 42 U.S.C. § 5813 (1976). The NRC was given licensing responsibility
over nuclear activities, including licensing of nuclear reactors, 42 U.S.C. § 5843 (1976),
and waste disposal facilities, 42 U.S.C. § 5842 (1976). Pursuant to section 301 of the
Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7151 (Supp. 1977), ERDA's
nuclear waste management development and research functions were transferred to
the Department of Energy (DOE).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also has some regulatory responsibilities with regard to radioactive wastes. The EPA is authorized (1) under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199, 200 (1970 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app., at 609 (1970) and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970), to establish "generally applicable
environmental standards for the protection of the general environment from radioactive material," and to provide broad federal guidance for all aspects of radiation
protection; (2) under the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(33 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1421 (1976)), to regulate the disposal of radioactive waste in the
oceans; (3) under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7626
(Supp. 1977), to regulate radioactive effluents to the atmosphere.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
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age and disposal of wastes generated - there are serious regulatory gaps for dealing with the radioactive wastes. The end
result is the creation of a substantial risk to public health and
safety and the undermining of the objectives of the AEA and
NEPA to protect the public from the radiological hazards of
radioactive wastes.
This article discusses a number of the most serious of these
regulatory failings.4 Specifically, it addresses the major, past
and existing, inadequacies in the system for the licensing of
uranium milling operations and nuclear reactors which generate the wastes, as well as flaws in the regulatory structure for
the licensing of a permanent waste disposal facility.
These regulatory issues are currently of critical importance. As public attention has become more focused on the
problems of radioactive waste, the federal government has increased its efforts to address the waste management and disposal problem. Major decisions, involving statutory, political,
and technical considerations, are now being made with respect
to the regulatory requirements to be applied at each of the
phases of the commercial fuel cycle discussed herein.
I. THE WASTES - THEIR ToXIcITY AND MAGNITUDE
The major categories of commercial radioactive wastes
include the "tailings" from uranium mills, spent fuel rods, socalled "high-level" wastes, transuranic contaminated wastes,
and low-level wastes.
A. Uranium Mill Tailings
The first step in producing enriched uranium fuel for nuclear power plants is the milling of the uranium ore. The ore,
which is usually from a nearby mine, is crushed, ground, and
chemically treated in a mill to extract and concentrate the
uranium. The processed ore is then discharged into a tailings
pond as a solids-laden liquid. The water seeps into the ground
or evaporates, eventually leaving a dry pile of sandlike waste.
Uranium tailings contain natural radionuclides that are highly
toxic, and long lived. For example, thorium-230, which is a
highly toxic isotope contained in large amounts within mill
4. This article is not intended as a general survey of all existing regulatory flaws
associated with radioactive wastes. For example, numerous gaps associated in the
regulation of military-generated wastes, with the disposal of commercially generated
low-level waste and with away-from-reactor interim storage of commercial wastes are
not addressed.
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tailings, has a half-life (decay period) of 80,000 years, and,
therefore, it must be isolated from man on the order of a million
years or longer.
Human beings may be exposed to the radionuclide constituents of uranium mill tailings piles through the inhalation of
wind-blown particulates from unstabilized piles, of radon gas
which emanates from the piles, or of decay products from escaped radon. 5 Also, a person may be exposed by direct radiation from the piles, or through ingestion of contaminated water
supplies.' To provide full protection, undue human exposure to
the tailings from any of these possible pathways must be prevented.
In eight Western states, approximately twenty-five million
tons of radioactive mill tailings have already accumulated at
twenty-two mill sites, which are now inactive.' These sites have
been abandoned by the operators, and the piles are largely
unstabilized. While the potential dangers associated with these
existing sites are grave enough, the problems in the coming two
or three decades will be much greater. The annual amount of
natural uranium required to fuel nuclear plants is projected to
increase more than ten-fold by the end of this century As of
August 1978, there were twenty-one mills in active operation
throughout the United States, and the NRC estimates that 109
mills will be needed by the year 2000 to support the United
States' commercial nuclear power industry.' Correspondingly,
the accumulated volume of uranium mill tailings would increase by thirty-fold in that period.' 0
5. Potentially, the most serious health hazard posed by the uranium mill tailings
is the emanation of radon gas from tailings piles for hundreds of thousands of years.
The escaped radon and its decay products would expose millions of people to low levels
of radiation that probably would increase the rate of lung cancer. Some scientists have
estimated that the radon released from uranium mill tailings resulting from fueling one
large power reactor for a year would cause ultimately on the order of 400 lung cancer
deaths. See Pohl, Health Effects of Radon-222 From Uranium Mining, 7 SEARCH 345,
346-348 (1976).
6. U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, SUMMARY REPORT: PHASE I STUDY OF INACTIVE
URANIUM MINE SITEs AND TILmNG PnFS, 9-10 (October 1974).

7. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, URANIUM MIL TAILINGS CLEANUP: FEDERAL
LEADERSHIP AT LAST? 1 (June 20, 1978) [hereinafter G.A.O. MILL TAILINGS REPORT].
8. U.S. AToMic ENERGY COMMISSION, NUCLEAR POWER GROWTH 1974-2000, WASH1139 at 29 (February 1974).
9. G.A.O. MILL TAILNGS REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
10. J. BLOMCKE, C. KEE, & J. NICHOLS, PROJECTIONS OF
GENERATED BY THE

1974).

U.S.

NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY,

RADIOACTIVE WASTES TO BE

ORNL-TM 3965 at 97 (February
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B. Reactor Generated Wastes
Once the uranium is removed from the ore and fabricated
into fuel, it is utilized in nuclear power plants. These plants
generate electricity through the fissioning, i.e., splitting, of
uranium and plutonium atoms in the core of nuclear reactors."
This fission process produces heat which converts water into
steam which in turn powers electric generators. As the fissionable isotopes in the fuel are depleted, the resulting waste product, the "spent fuel rods," are then withdrawn from the nuclear
reactor cores.
Until recently, the federal government and the nuclear
power industry had planned on chemically treating, or
"reprocessing," spent fuel in order to remove the un-fissioned
isotopes of plutonium and uranium for use in fresh fuel. When
reprocessing occurs, so-called "high-level radioactive wastes"
are produced.'" However, in April 1977, President Carter announced that reprocessing would be deferred indefinitely, because of the additional risks to public health and safety arising
from the separation and wide-spread utilization of plutonium
that could be used to fabricate nuclear explosive devices. 3
Under this new policy, spent fuel is the final form of high-level
waste for ultimate disposal.
Other wastes created as by-products of the nuclear fuel
cycle include "transuranic" wastes and "low-level" wastes.
These wastes are comprised of materials such as clothing,
glass, and metal that become contaminated with radioactivity.
Transuranic wastes (so-called because the atomic numbers of
some of the radionuclides in the waste are higher than uranium
on the periodic table of elements) are produced primarily at
reprocessing plants and facilities where plutonium is incorporated into fresh fuel. Thus, if there is no commercial reprocessing, no significant additional commercial transuranic wastes
11. Plutonium is absent in "fresh" fuel, but it builds up in the reactor core during
the operation of power plants. Some of the plutonium eventually fissions and contributes to the release of energy.
12. 10 C.F.R. § 50 app. F (1978), provides in pertinent part: "'[Huigh-level liquid
radioactive wastes' means those aqueous wastes resulting from the operation of the
first cycle solvent extraction system, or equivalent, and the concentrated wastes from
subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a facility for reprocessing irradiated

reactor fuels."
13. ExEcUTIvE OFFICE OF THE PRESmIDENT,
TIONAL ENERGY PLAN 70 (April 29, 1977).

ENERGY POLCY AND PLANNING,

THE

NA-
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will be generated. Low-level wastes, on the other hand, are
produced at nuclear reactor sites themselves. While there is
much overlap in the general types of materials constituting
low-level and transuranic wastes, the low-level wastes do not
include the "heavier" radionuclides with atomic numbers
higher than uranium.
Like the uranium mill tailings, the wastes produced by
power plants are highly toxic, and their management and disposal represents one of the most difficult problems of the nuclear era. For example, one of the most dangerous of the radionuclides generated by nuclear reactors, plutonium-239, is so
toxic that as little as three micrograms -

a "speck" -

can

cause lung cancer in animals." Moreover, because of its exceedingly long half-life of 24,000 years, the large quantities of plutonium produced in reactors will remain potentially harmful to
mankind for at least several hundred thousand years.
Significant quantities of extremely toxic radioactive
wastes have already been produced by the operation of commercial nuclear reactors and sizeable increases in quantity are
projected. At present, about seventy commercial nuclear power
reactors are operating within this country," and by the year
2000, the NRC has projected that over 500 such reactors may
be operating." Over 600,000 gallons of commercial liquid highlevel wastes" and about 4,000 metric tons of commercial waste
in spent fuel rods already exist. Is When measured by long-lived

radioactivity (an indicator of potential hazard), the current
inventory of these radioactive wastes is expected to double
within three or four years, and will be twenty times greater by
the end of the century."9
14. Bair & Thompson, Plutonium: Biomedical Research, 183 SCIENCE 715, 720
(1974).
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR GENERATING UNITS IN THE UNITED
STATES AS OF JUNE 30, 1978 (August 9, 1978).
16. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, FINAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT ON THE USE OF RECYCLED PLUTONIUM IN MIXED OXIDE FUEL IN LIGHT WATER COOLED
REACTORS, NUREG-0002, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at S-12 (August 1976).
17. M. WILLRICH AND R.K. LESTER, RADIOACTIVE WASTE, MANAGEMENT AND
REGULATION 14 (1977).
18. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, REPORT OF TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF NUCLEAR
WASTE MANAGEMENT (Draft), DOEER-0004/D 66 (February 1978) [hereinafter DEUTCH

REPORT].
19. U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, PUBLIC COMMENTS AND TASK FORCE

RESPONSES REGARDING THE ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY OF THE REPROCESSING AND WASTE
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THE UNSATISFACTORY HISTORY OF WASTE MANAGEMENT

The history of the management of these various radioactive waste products has been checkered with missteps, changes
in direction, and aborted planning, which serve to underscore
the need for an improved regulatory apparatus. For example,
in 1952 through 1966, mill tailings were used extensively as
construction fill in houses, schools, businesses, sidewalks and
highways in Grand Junction, Colorado. The serious threat to
public health from this material was not recognized until later.
A remedial program was commenced in 1972, and it is estimated that hazardous tailings fill must be removed from about
700 locations.20 Yet, six years later, the remedial program is
only half completed. It remains entirely voluntary and apparently few local contractors are interested in performing the
remedial work." No regulatory action was ever undertaken by
the federal government to prevent this occurrence or to compel
an effective cleanup.
Elsewhere, uranium milling operations have contaminated
public water supplies. As early as 1958, investigators discovered that the drinking water in two towns along the Animas
River below Durango, Colorado - Aztec and Farmington, New
Mexico - contained concentrations of radioactivity exceeding
federal standards.22 Furthermore, as a result of the sequestration of minerals in the river food chains, radium concentrations
in the river flora and fauna were 100 to 10,000 times the concentrations found in the river water itself.? Indeed, grasses and
alfalfa irrigated with the water and consumed by livestock,
contained concentrations of radium 100 times greater than the
river water.2 '
The contamination of ground water near active mill sites
continues to be a problem. In 1974 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) surveyed water discharges from uranium
milling and mining complexes in the Grants Mineral Belt in
New Mexico. EPA found that ground water in the vicinity of
the uranium mills exceeded EPA limits for certain poisonous
MANAGEMENT PORTIONS OF THE

LWR

FuEL CYCLE,

NUREG-0216 (Supp. 2 to WASH-

1248) 3-113 (March 1977).

20. G.A.O. MILL
21.
22.
23.
24.

TAILINGS REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.

Id. at 22-25.
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE NucLE

Id.
Id.

FUEL CYCLE 47 (1975).
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chemicals by as much as 7,300 percent. 5 The study also found
that radioactive contamination of the drinking water near some
of the mills grossly exceeded drinking water standards and
posed a health hazard to the employees and their families. 21
The wastes generated by the operation of commercial nuclear reactors have also been seriously mismanaged in a number of instances. For example, all of the commercial high-level
liquid wastes resulting from previous reprocessing of spent fuel
are currently stored at West Valley, New York. The initial
plans contemplated that these wastes would be stored indefinitely in liquid form in near-surface storage tanks. It was envisioned that repeated transfers of these wastes to new tanks
would be made as the old storage tanks deteriorated.
The West Valley program, however, was marked from the
beginning by inadequate study and unforeseen safety problems. First, no plan was established in advance to ensure that
the wastes could be safely removed from the older tanks when
it came time to transfer them to new ones. Then, in 1970, the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) promulgated new regulations requiring all high-level wastes generated in the future to
be solidified within five years of their generation, thus belatedly recognizing that the practice it had licensed at West Valley was inadequate.2 The new policy also provided that a specific proceeding on the future of West Valley wastes would be
initiated, because of the particular problems in solidifying the
existing wastes there.2 Nonetheless, eight years later, no such
proceeding has been commenced. Even worse, no satisfactory,
safe method of removing the wastes from existing tanks has
been developed, and additional special research must now be
conducted to rectify past errors in decisionmaking.
The cost of remedying the waste disposal problem at West
Valley has been estimated as high as $600 million, and implementation of an effective cleanup operation may take as long
as fourteen years." Among the unresolved questions is who will
25. U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

WATER QUALITY IMPACTS OF URA-

NIUM MING AND MILLING ACrmEs IN THE GRANTs MINERAL BELT, NEW MEXICO,

No

6/9/75/002 58 (September 1975).
26. Id. at 60.
27. 10 C.F.R. § 50 app. F (1978).
28. Id.

29. HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, WEST VALLEY AND THE NucizA
DILEMMA, H.R. REP. No. 755, 95th Cong., lt Sess. 16 (1977).
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pay for and carry out this operation, the commercial site operator, the state of New York, or the federal government.
To date, governmental efforts to establish a permanent
repository for commercial radioactive wastes have also been
unsatisfactory. Twenty-five years after Congress authorized
the commercial development of nuclear power, no permanent
waste repository has been built, and there is no approved plan
for such a facility. Instead, one proposal after another has been
explored and abandoned.0 Indeed, the NRC admits that up to
about 1970, whatever waste management policy existed "had
been more or less ad hoc. ,,31
Shortly after passage of the AEA, the AEC and its advisors
focused on bedded salt deposits as the most likely underground
geological formation for disposal of the long-lived commercial
wastes.2 In the late 1960's, the government finally selected an
abandoned salt mine near Lyons, Kansas, as the location for a
pilot repository for the wastes. However, later investigation
disclosed, among other things, that water from adjacent mining operations might seep into the repository and dissolve the
salt containing the waste. In early 1972, the Lyons, Kansas, site
was abandoned.1
Next, in May 1972, the AEC announced its plan to build
a so-called "retrievable surface storage facility" or "RSSF" an engineered facility constructed near the surface of the earth
to store the commercial wastes for an indeterminate period
of time, while the prolonged search for an acceptable, safe geological site continued. Three years later, however, the waste
program changed direction once again. In the spring of 1975,
the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA) withdrew the request for congressional appropriations
for the RSSF, although it was purportedly retained as a backup
system in case "other repository plans failed."'
30. NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COMM., CALIFORNIA ENERGY REOURCES CONSERVATION AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, STATUS OF NUCLEAR FUE. REPROCESSING, SPENT FUEL STOR-

AGE AND HIGH-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL (Draft) 117-118 (January 11, 1978).
31. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY OF THE REPROCESSING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT PORTIONS OF THE LWR FUEL CYCLE - A TASK FORCE

REPORT,
32.
33.
34.

NUREG-0116 (Supp. 1 to WASH-1248) at D-3 (October 1976).
Id. at D-2.
Id. at D-3.
Id. at D-4.
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With a resurrected near-term emphasis on the development of a deep geologic repository, ERDA expanded its efforts
to locate a potential geologic formation for commercial wastes
and in 1976 focused on a salt formation in the state of Michigan
for investigation. However, in June 1977, after residents of
northern Michigan had voted overwhelmingly to prohibit the
siting of a waste repository within their state, the federal government abandoned its efforts to locate the repository in the
state of Michigan.
The draft report of a recent Department of Energy (DOE)
task force on radioactive waste management" makes clear how
much uncertainty surrounds the government's current efforts
to establish a repository for the permanent storage of radioactive wastes. At the outset, the task force report notes that the
"federal government, as an entity, has not formally reached a
conclusion on ultimate disposal of high level wastes."" The
report then highlights the uncertainties surrounding this endeavor. First, the report concludes that the federal government's previous target deadline of 1985 for the establishment
of a waste repository will now be delayed until 1988, at "the
earliest date. ' ' Second, it is apparent from the report that
fundamental questions continue to exist about the threshold
determination of what geologic medium is appropriate for
waste disposal. The report now questions the government's
almost exclusive focus upon bedded salt deposits and recommends that a variety of other geologic media be considered
more seriously. 3' Finally, the report recognizes that several
important technical issues remain unresolved. In general, the
report calls for additional efforts in "developing scientific data,
safety analysis and systems models to improve the scientific
bases for specific media choice, site selection and repository
designs. '"40
Important unresolved scientific and technical problems
concerning waste disposal have been highlighted recently in
35.

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, THE UNITED

STATES NUCLEAR ENERGY DILEMMA: DISPOSING OF HAZARDOUS RADIOACTIVE WASTES

SAFELY 15 (September 9, 1977).
36. See DEUTCH REPORT, supra

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

7.
12.
9, 52.
3, 9, 26.

note 18.
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other government studies as well." Most recently an interagency review group'" (IRG) prepared a comprehensive report
reviewing the nuclear waste disposal issue and recommending
changes to improve the existing program. The draft report acknowledges that management of radioactive wastes for the past
three decades can be characterized by "inadequate integration
of waste management R&D (research and development) efforts
• . .caused in part by inadequate perceptions of the additional
technological and scientific capabilities needed to develop an
acceptable disposal capability . . . ,,'i
Among other things,
the report calls for legislative change to increase the federal
government's regulatory powers over various nuclear waste
forms," and for adherence to a comprehensive work schedule
directed towards completion of a high-level waste repository by
1995.'" Following public comment, the report will be forwarded
to the President for his consideration and guidance in further
action." If adopted and implemented, it appears the IRG recommendations will improve the nuclear waste management
program, but it will not resolve the problem. The IRG report
is incomplete and, in some instances, recommends policies inconsistent with full protection of the public and the environment. The IRG report, for instance, does not make the link
between continued operation of nuclear power plants and the
lack of progress in developing a permanent waste disposal facility for the wastes created by the plants. The IRG report also
recommends against comprehensive regulation of the government's own wastes by the NRC. Moreover, significant doubt
remains about the ability to implement the program recommended by the IRG report. Thus, although the IRG effort may
be an important advance in federal decisionmaking, substantial uncertainty still remains about the adequacy of the waste
management and disposal program.
41. Carter, Nuclear Wastes: The Science of Geologic Disposal Seen as Weak, 200
SCIENCE 1135 (1978).

42.

INTERAGENCY

REVIEW GROUP, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE INTERAGENCY

REVIEW GROUP ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. iv.
Id. x, xiv.
Id. xxi-xxiii.
Id. iii.

TID-28817 (Draft) (October 1978).
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DEFICIENCIES IN THE REGULATORY SYSTEM

A.

Uranium Mill Tailings
In the past, inconsistent state and federal licensing programs over uranium mill tailings have created a major flaw in
the regulation of this radioactive waste product. A number of
states' programs have failed to adequately protect the public
health and safety. In an effort to rectify this regulatory deficiency, on November 8, 1978, President Carter signed into law
the Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978.17 This new
legislation makes more explicit the states' obligation to develop
regulatory programs over uranium mill tailings that are more

consistent with that of the federal government. This legislation, if fully implemented, will mark a substantial advance in
the management and control of uranium mill tailings.
The NRC is empowered by section 63 of the AEA1" to issue
source material licenses for possession of uranium. This license
is necessary for the operation of a uranium mill. Pursuant to
section 274 of the AEA,11 however, the NRC may delegate this
and certain other licensing responsibilties to the states under
the so-called Agreement State Program.5 Twenty-five states
have become agreement states." As of August 1978, eleven of
the twenty-one active uranium mills in the United States were
located in the agreement states of New Mexico, Colorado,
Texas, and Washington, and were licensed directly by those
states. The other ten active mills were in non-agreement states
and were licensed by the federal government.
The licensing system administered by an agreement state
is supposed to provide the same level of protection for public
health and safety as the NRC would require. At the federal
level, however, the procedures mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act are an integral part of NRC licensing of
47. Pub. L. No. 95-604.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2093 (1976).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976).
50. The NRC is empowered to delegate regulatory responsibility to the state for
the regulation of by-product material, source materials and special nuclear materials
in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976). A
definition of these materials is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (1976).
51. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas and Washington.
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mills in non-agreement states. NEPA imposes strict responsibilities on federal agencies to ensure that environmental values
are considered.
Section 102 of the Act requires that each agency shall "to
the fullest extent possible" prepare an environmental impact
statement (EIS) which discloses, inter alia, the full range of
impacts and alternatives to a proposed action on all "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment."" Thus, if a mill is licensed directly by the NRC,
an EIS is always prepared.53 The EIS provides an independent
assessment of the impacts of the proposed mill upon the environment, alternative disposal methods and mill sitings, as well
as potential accidents and problems posed by decommissioning
the mill site once milling operations have been discontinued.
It is through this independent environmental analysis that the
most appropriate health and safety requirements to be applied
to milling operations can be determined.
On the other hand, in the agreement of states, no EIS is
prepared by the federal government under NEPA. While some
agreement states have enacted state laws that parallel NEPA
and require the preparation of environmental analyses, the
agreement states of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas,5" where
nine of the active mills are located, have lacked any state law
counterpart to NEPA. The licensing of uranium mills in these
states has been subject to far less stringent reviews and procedures than would have applied if the mills had been licensed
directly by the federal government. Thus, the three states
which have not required an EIS lacked an essential vehicle for
ensuring that important environmental considerations were
fully reviewed and incorporated into the decisionmaking process. The end result has been that these states have imposed
less stringent substantive standards than those imposed by the
52. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1976).
53. 10 C.F.R. § 51.5(a)(5) (1978). Although the NRC requires an applicant for a
uranium mill license in a non-agreement state to submit an environmental report, 10
C.F.R. §§ 51.20, 51.21 (1978), the agency is required to conduct its own independent
evaluation of environmental factors and independently prepare the draft and final
EIS's. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(c) (1978).
54. The State of Washington has a state law, similar to NEPA, which requires the
preparation of state environmental impact statements and makes the state program
more analogous to that administered by the federal government. State Environmentai
Policy Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C (1971).
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federal government, and less stringent standards than the
states themselves might have demanded were the mill licensing
decisions subject to a thorough and independent environmental review.
Moreover, the procedures employed by these states to facilitate public participation in the licensing process have been
sorely inadequate and widely divergent from those utilized by
the NRC. None of the states has had specific provisions for
public hearings to assess the far-ranging and long-term environmental impacts of a proposed mill. 5 Public notice of the
receipt of licensing applications is often perfunctory. In New
Mexico, for example, notices of receipt of applications have
been published only in certain local newspapers at unspecific
times.
In contrast, NRC regulations require public hearings on
each application for a mill license in non-agreement states, at
the request of the applicant or any affected party or on its own
motion. 6 Notice of receipt of all applications, as well as notice
of the public hearing, must be published in the Federal
7 Public participation is also solicited in the comRegister."
menting process on the draft environmental impact statement
prepared by the NRC on a proposed mill, and the availability
58
of the draft is announced in the FederalRegister.
Finally, the regulatory programs of these three agreement
states have not prohibited the construction of a mill prior to the
completion of the licensing process (even of the perfunctory
environmental analysis of the project that was conducted). In
contrast, the NRC regulations provide that the commencement
of any mill construction activities while the licensing process
is underway may result in the denial of the license.5 ' Clearly,
this restriction is necessary to avoid a premature commitment
of resources and the creation of inappropriate momentum towards a particular mill site or disposal methodology.
The inconsistencies between the uranium mill licensing
55. U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,

REGULATION OF URANIUM MILLS

WORKSHOP ON THE FEDERAL-STATE

NUREG/CR-0029 at 2 (February 1978).

56. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976); 10 C.F.R. § 2.105 (1978); 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a) (1978);
10 C.F.R. § 2.103(b)(2) (1978).
57. 10 C.F.R. § 2.105 (1978); 10 C.F.R. § 2.104 (1978).
58. 10 C.F.R. § 51.50(c) (1978); 10 C.F.R. § 51.24(f) (1978).
59. 10 C.F.R. § 40.32(e) (1978).
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programs of the federal government and the agreement states
arguably violated the requirement of the AEA, even before it
was amended and strengthened by the Uranium Mill Tailings
Control Act of 1978. The unamended AEA required that the
two programs be "compatible," and established two prongs to
this requirement. Under section 274(d)(2), the NRC had to find
prior to a delegation of authority to the state "that the State
program is compatible with the Commission's program for the
regulation of such materials, and that the State program is
adequate to protect public health and safety with respect to the
materials covered by the proposed agreement." 0 And, in section 274(g), the Commission was directed "to assure that State
and Commission programs for protection against hazards of
radiation will be coordinated and compatible."'"
As the language suggests, the purpose of these provisions
is to ensure that the delegation of authority from the Commission to the State does not result in a relaxation of the Act's
mandate to protect the public health and safety from the hazards of radioactive materials. The decided shortcomings in the
procedures utilized by the agreement states, as enumerated
above, appear to handicap the fulfillment of this mandate and
render these state programs incompatible with the Commission's program.
Apart from the requirements of the AEA, NEPA itself appears to require that the agreement states at least prepare environmental impact statements or their equivalent, in licensing
uranium mills. Despite the delegation of licensing authority to
the agreement states, the federal government remains substantially involved in the process for licensing uranium mills in
those states. For example, the NRC: (1) retains the right to
reassert its own licensing authority; (2) conducts annual reviews of the overall operations of the agreement state pro60. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)(2) (1976). Section 204(b) of the Uranium Mill Tailings
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 95-604, has strengthened this provision of the AEA by inserting the phrase "in accordance with the requirements of subsection o and in all other
respects" before the word "compatible." Subsection "o" of section 204 of the new
legislation in turn makes more explicit the state's obligation, prior to issuance of a
uranium mill license, to provide a number of important procedural safeguards and to
ensure that state substantive standards are at least equivalent to those of the federal
government.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(g) (1976). This provision of the AEA was not amended by
the Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-604.
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grams, including the states' licensing decisions and environmental programs; (3) provides training, technical assistance
and inspection of the state program; (4) reviews and comments
upon all license applications filed with these states; and (5)
expends sizeable federal funds in administering the agreement
state program. In some cases, this level of ongoing federal involvement has sufficed to compel the preparation of an EIS
under NEPA, although state or private parties were vested
2
with substantial responsibilities for the action in question.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the federal
agency primarily charged with administering and interpreting
NEPA, has expressed informally its view that EIS's are required in agreement states under both the compatibility provisions of the AEA and under NEPA."3 CEQ concluded that
NEPA's policies must be taken into account in interpreting the
requirement of compatibility. It further noted that delegation
of authority to a state does not remove the Commission from
the process for purposes of NEPA, and that the disparity in the
implementation of NEPA between agreement and nonagreement states was "anomalous."
These deficiencies in the Agreement State Program were
challenged in an action now pending in the Federal District
court in New Mexico, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. NRC.11 In particular, the suit challenges New Mexico's issuance of a license for a specific uranium mill without preparing
62. See, e.g., Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d
1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972); Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Tex. Highway Dep't, 446
F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
63. Letter from Charles Warren, Chairman, CEQ, to Joseph Hendrie, Chairman,
NRC (September 6, 1977).
In draft regulations CEQ also made clear its view that in all instances, a delegation
of licensing authority does not relieve the federal government of responsibility to insure
that an EIS is prepared, if otherwise required. 43 Fed. Reg, 25,230, 25,245 (1978).
However, in response to public comments suggesting that "application of NEPA
in such circumstances is a highly complicated issue; that its proper resolution depends
on a variety of factors that may differ significantly from one program to the next and
should be weighed on a case-by-case basis ......
43 Fed. Reg. 55, 978, 55,989 (1978),
CEQ in its final regulations determined not to address this issue. While CEQ has thus
declined to express an official opinion on NEPA's application across the board when
licensing authority is delegated to a state, it has opted for a case-by-case approach for
the time being. With respect to delegation of licensing authority over uranium mills,
through its opinion letter from Charles Warren to Joseph Hendrie, CEQ has indicated
its view that NEPA clearly applies.
64. No. 77-240(B), filed May 3, 1977.
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an EIS or providing adequate public participation, and requests that an EIS be prepared, accompanied by all the procedural safeguards enumerated above for the mill in question. In
the alternative, the suit asks that the Agreement State Program with New Mexico be terminated, and that the NRC resume direct licensing and EIS responsibility over the mill. The
claims are asserted both under the "compatibility provisions"
of the AEA and under NEPA.
In part in response to this litigation, Congress passed the
Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978.5 The legislation
addresses, among other issues," many of the specific inadequacies challenged in the litigation and makes explicit the
states' obligation, prior to the issuance of licenses for uranium
mills, to require the preparation of environmental analyses
analogous to EIS's, to conduct public hearings, based on a
record subject to judicial review, and to prohibit the construction of a uranium mill until an adequate environmental analysis has been completed. 7 The legislation further makes more
explicit the states' obligation to impose substantive standards
for uranium mill licenses that are equivalent to or more stringent than those imposed by the federal government in its licensing process. 8 If the states fail to bring their regulatory
65. Pub. L. No. 95-604.
66. The new legislation also rectifies a number of other serious problems in the
regulation of mill tailings that existed with respect to regulation of inactive mill sites.
In the past the NRC has not exercised regulatory control over tailings piles at these
sites. By narrowly defining the term "source material" to exclude any material which
contains less than 0.05 percent of uranium and/or thorium by weight, the NRC has
excluded the tailings piles themselves. 10 C.F.R. § 40.4(h) (1978). At active mill sites
the NRC has taken the position that the tailings piles can be regulated under the
source material license issued for the mill. However, once a mill is closed, and its source
material license has been terminated, the NRC has maintained that its regulatory
involvement is concluded. The new legislation, however, resolves the problem by
amending the AEA definition of the term "by-product" material to include specifically
uranium mill tailings and thereby make explicit continuing NRC jurisdiction over the
tailings piles at inactive sites. Pub. L. No. 95-604 § 201.
The Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978 also rectifies another problem
related to long term control over tailings piles that has arisen under past land ownership practices which permitted private mill operators to own the tailings disposal sites.
Since the mill tailings must be isolated for tens of thousands of years, it is essential to
have assurance that the entity owning the land will have long term viability. The new
legislation recognizes there is no such assurance with a private operator and requires
federal or state ownership of the disposal site unless the NRC makes a specific determination that private ownership poses no threat to the public health and safety. Id. §
83a.
67. Id. § 204 o(3).
68. Id. § 204 0(2).
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programs into line with the new legislation the NRC can revoke
the states' licensing authority over uranium mills in order to
protect the public health and safety."9
The extent to which the states will be willing and able to
comply with the requirements of the Uranium Mill Tailings
Control Act of 1978 is still an open issue. There is, however, no
question that this new legislation is a tremendous advance towards remedying a number of the regulatory deficiencies described above and a tremendous step towards reducing a serious potential health consequence.
B. The Reactor Licensing Process
Radioactive wastes with higher levels of toxicity are generated by the nuclear power plants which utilize the fuel rods
fabricated after the uranium milling process. These wastes are
the inevitable by-products of the licensing of additional power
reactors. Any commitment to responsible decisionmaking,
therefore, would seem to dictate that the environmental impact of these wastes and the feasibility of their safe permanent
storage be given the fullest consideration in the licensing of the
reactors which generate these wastes. Without these kinds of
analyses, the wastes generated by new plants will greatly add
to the dimension of a problem which may prove intractable.
In any reactor licensing proceeding, the NRC must make
an environmental analysis pursuant to NEPA, disclosing the
full range of the impacts of the proposed project. The NRC
must also make an explicit finding pursuant to the AEA that
the decision to license the reactor will not jeopardize the public
health and safety. Unfortunately, the NRC's review of the
radioactive waste problem in both the NEPA and the AEA
contexts is sorely deficient.
The Reactor NEPA Review
It is now well settled that the environmental analysis conducted pursuant to NEPA during reactor licensing must extend to an evaluation of the environmental impacts of the
radioactive wastes generated by the reactor. Only through a
C.

69. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(y) as amended by the Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-604, § 204(d).
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consideration of these impacts can the true costs of an individual reactor be assessed. Particularly in instances where
projected demand for the energy is uncertain or acceptable
alternative technologies are available to meet demand, the
NRC hearing board's weighing of the impacts of the radioactive wastes may tip the balance against the issuance of a
reactor license. While the logic of this approach seems clear,
it has yet to be implemented adequately by the NRC.
Initially, this issue was excluded from consideration in reactor licensing. In a hearing on the license application for the
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, the Appeals Board
held that the NEPA review of radioactive wastes when they
leave the reactor should be limited to the environmental effects
of the transportation of the wastes .from the reactor to reprocessing plants and that the impact of the reprocessing plants
or the disposal of wastes need not be evaluated."'
Shortly thereafter, the AEC instituted a rulemaking proceeding to reconsider whether the environmental effects of all
stages of the nuclear fuel cycle should be included in the NEPA
cost-benefit analysis for licensing individual reactors.7 ' The
AEC concluded that although the waste disposal impacts were
"relatively insignificant,"7" it was desirable to consider them in
this forum. The AEC then promulgated a rule - the so-called
Table S-3 - to be factored into the cost-benefit analysis for
3
individual nuclear reactors.
Table S-3 is a numerical tabulation of the postulated impacts of the radioactive wastes resulting from the operation of
a single nuclear reactor. The Table attempts to identify the
adverse impacts of the nuclear fuel cycle by listing the amount
of radioactive effluents that will be released to the environment, as well as the land and water resources that will be
committed to waste management and disposal efforts at all
phases of the fuel cycle. The rulemaking envisioned that Table
S-3 would be incorporated into individual environmental impact statements prepared on light water reactors considered for
70.
71.
72.
73.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., ALAB 56, 4 A.E.C. 930 (June 6, 1972).
37 Fed. Reg. 24191 (1972) (codified in 10 C.F.R. § 50 (1978)).
39 Fed. Reg. 14188,. 14190 (1974) (codified in 10 C.F.R. § 51.20(e) (1978)).
Id. at 14191.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

licensing, and that it would suffice as the sole discussion of
these matters within the EIS.7 '
The adequacy of the rulemaking was challenged in
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC.7 5 The court
of appeals found that the evidence presented by the AEC in the
proceeding left important questions unresolved and that credibility of the rule was not adequately tested. The court held that
more extensive procedures than traditional notice and comment rulemaking should have been afforded participants in the
proceeding. The court ordered a remand of the matter to the
NRC for a more thorough review of these issues. In dictum, the
court also identified a number of deficiencies in the format of
the Table S-3.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision
of the court of appeals. The Court's opinion focused exclusively
on the question of the adequacy of the procedures used by the
NRC in conducting the generic rulemaking. The Court determined that the agency's utilization of traditional notice and
comment rulemaking procedures was sufficient to permit an
adequate review of the waste impact issue. In remanding the
matter, the Supreme Court specifically left open the question
of whether the particular record developed by the agency in
support of Table S-3 was adequate in fact to sustain the rule."
The Supreme Court did not consider whether the format of
Table S-3 was adequate.
As to the adequacy of Table S-3, the court of appeals had
suggested that the approach taken was misleading and tended
to minimize the environmental impacts. Specifically, it observed that "the toxic life of the wastes under discussion far
exceeds the life of the plant being licensed," and it suggested
that Table S-3 improperly abbreviated consideration of the
environmental impacts of radioactive wastes generated by a
nuclear reactor to the operating life of any given reactor (some
74. Id.
75. 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev 'd and remanded on other grounds sub noma.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 98 S.Ct.
1197 (1978).
76. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
98 S.Ct. 1197, 1207 n.14 (1978). The question of the adequacy of the record to sustain
the initial S-3 rule is currently pending before the court of appeals. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, No. 74-1385 (D.C. Cir.) remanded April 3, 1978.
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40 years).77 The court of appeals stated that the "full detoxification period" for these wastes would.provide a more appropriate time period for the environmental assessment."'
The court also concluded that Table S-3's "focus on only
the incremental impact of waste generated by an additional
reactor," rather than the prospective cumulative effects of all
operating light water reactors, was misleading." Finally, the
court stated that meaningful assessment of the potential environmental impacts of waste disposal might include a discussion of the feasibility and availability of the technology underlying the environmental predictions.")
After the decision of the court of appeals"' and while the
matter was still pending in the Supreme Court, the NRC reopened the S-3 rulemaking proceedings in May 1977, to develop the final S-3 rule.82 The reopened administrative proceeding was conducted over the course of some thirteen
months, and the evidentiary record was closed June 26, 1978.si
In its existing format, Table S-3 would appear to violate
the most rudimentary requirements of NEPA - including the
deficiencies which the court of appeals identified. The current
S-3 rule lacks any narrative accompanying the Table which
would describe in clear and understandable terms the many
uncertainties and non-quantifiable factors inherent in the calculations underlying the numbers in the Table. It fails to disclose the actual adverse health impacts on man in terms of
genetic mutations and cancers, relying instead upon a quantification of the curies of radioactive waste released. The Table
limits its impact analysis to a fifty year cut-off point, rather
77. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 639 n.12 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 640 n.13.
81. Immediately following the court of appeals decision, the NRC staff drafted an
interim S-3 rule. This interim S-3 rule was modeled on a numerical chart identical to
the initial Table S-3 with revisions limited to a few of the numbers contained in the
chart. This interim S-3 rule was seen as a temporary measure that would be utilized
in EIS's in individual reactor licensing proceedings pending completion of the generic
proceeding to develop a final S-3 rule. 42 Fed. Reg. 13,803, 13,806 (1977). A challenge
to this interim rule is also currently pending before the court of appeals. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, No. 77-1448 (D.C. Cir., filed May 13, 1977).
82. 42 Fed. Reg. 26,987 (1977).
83. Memorandum and Order from the Hearing Board, Docket No. RM 50-3 (May
4, 1978); as amended by the Memorandum and Order of May 10, 1978.
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than calculating adverse health impacts over the entire time
period the radionuclides remain toxic. And finally, it lacks any
assessment of the cumulative impacts of all operating reactors
throughout the country, evaluating instead only the impacts of
one year's operation of a single reactor.
It is axiomatic under NEPA that an EIS must be written
in a form "understandable to nontechnical minds and yet contain enough scientific reasoning to alert specialists to particular problems within the field of their expertise.""4 An EIS must
identify limitations upon the ability to assess fully environmental impacts," and must also discuss the "history of success
and failure of similar projects."" NEPA also requires that an
EIS disclose "to the fullest extent possible" the environmental
effects of a proposed action"7 and the cumulative effects of a
8
series of actions or projects.1
Measured against these standards, the Table appears seriously deficient. A chart of numbers such as Table S-3 affords
little opportunity for critical evaluation by the lay public, as
required by the full disclosure objectives of NEPA. Indeed,
without an accompanying narrative explaining how the figures
were derived, and translating numerical values into understandable concepts, Table S-3 is meaningless to the public at
large. Nor can a chart of numbers disclose the numerous uncertainties and the wide diversity of scientific opinions that exist
concerning the true environmental impacts of the waste disposal system postulated in Table S-3 and the validity of the
Table's calculations. Similarly, a numerical chart cannot convey the long history of waste management problems and unsuc84. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916,
933 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 1123 (1974); See also Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Grant, 355 F.Supp. 280, 286 (E.D.N.C. 1973); Sierra Club v. Morton,
510 F.2d 813, 820 (5th Cir. 1975); Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality,
40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(b) (1977).
85. Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. A.E.C., 481 F.2d 1079, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,
325 F.Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
86. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 355 F.Supp. 280, 288
(E.D.N.C. 1973); See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 824 (5th Cir. 1975).
87. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114
(D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. A.E.C.,
481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC,
547 F.2d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
88. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409-10 (1976); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1975).
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cessful waste disposal efforts that have characterized waste
management activities in this country to date."y Finally, the
chart's truncation of the time period for the evaluation of adverse health effects to only one year's operation of a single
nuclear reactor, rather than its full operating life, appears to
violate the NEPA principles as described above.
As yet, no final NRC action has been taken with respect
to the modifications necessary to establish an adequate final
rule." Unless substantial modifications in the rule are made,
no doubt the final rule will be legally deficient and will be
subject to challenge. Uncertainty resulting from the lack of a
final rule will continue to surround nuclear licensing, and the
public and decisionmakers will continue to be deprived of adequate information on which to base their reactor licensing decisions.
D. The Atomic Energy Act Reactor Safety Review
As part of the pervasive concern for public safety in the
AEA,1' the NRC is required to undertake a safety review of
89. See text accompanying notes 7-13 supra.
90. The administrative hearing board in charge of this rulemaking proceeding has,
however, recommended to the NRC Commissioners (1) that a table of numbers, revised
only to the most limited extent, be adopted as a "final" rule, (2) that an extremely
brief accompanying narrative be developed at some unspecified time and (3) that
various additional modifications (such as inclusion of cumulative impacts and adverse
impacts in terms of man-reins of radiation) be made in a future S-3 update proceeding.
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Hearing Board, NRC Docket No. RM 50-3
(October 26, 1978). These recommendations appear to fall far short of NEPA's requirements both because they fail to encompass the wide range of modifications necessary
in the S-3 rule and because they defer indefinitely and unnecessarily the limited
modifications that are proposed.
91. In section 2 of the AEA, Congress specifically found that the "processing and
utilization" of nuclear materials "must be regulated . . . to protect the health and
safety of the public," and that "regulation by the United States of the production and
utilization of atomic energy and of the facilities used in connection therewith is necessary . . . to protect the health and safety of the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2102(d), (e)
(1976). Numerous provisions in the Act mandate consideration of public health and
safety in the exercise of regulatory responsibilities. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2014(v)
(production facility defined in terms of impact on public health and safety); § 2014(cc)
(utilization facility defined in terms of impact on public health and safety); § 2021(d)
(licensing authority delegated to the states contingent upon protection of the public
health and safety); § 2039 (reactor safeguard committee established to report on potential hazards of reactor safety); § 2051(a)(5) (research program shall be directed, inter
alia, to protect the public health and safety); § 2073(e)(7) (licenses for special nuclear
material issued pursuant to standards to protect public health and safety); § 2099
(licenses to handle source material issued only if they will not be inimical to public
health and safety); § 2111 (nuclear by-product material exempt from licensing only if
there will be no unreasonable risk to the public health and safety); § 2134(a) (medical
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proposed reactor licenses and to make an explicit, definitive
finding that the activities authorized by the license can be
conducted safely. 2 Section 103(b) of the AEA directs the NRC
to issue reactor licenses to only those persons who will observe
"such safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property as the Commission may by rule establish."9 Section 103(d) precludes the issuance of a license for the
production or utilization of nuclear materials if it "would be
inimical to . . . the health and safety of the public."" Section
182 requires the Commission to make explicit findings in reactor licensing proceedings that the utilization and production of
special nuclear material "will provide adequate protection to
the health and safety of the public," and authorizes the Commission to obtain whatever information it deems necessary to
make such a finding. 5
The NRC's safety review in reactor licensing encompasses
a full range of risks and hazards associated with reactors with the important exception of the feasibility of permanently
disposing of the radioactive wastes generated by the reactor.
The NRC considers only the adequacy of interim storage of
radioactive wastes at the reactor site. 6 The agency maintains
that it has no statutory obligation to consider explicitly ultimate waste disposal in the reactor licensing context. The NRC
thus avoids making any regulatory link between the continued
licensing of reactors and the problem of disposing of their output of radioactive waste. The agency does contend that it
makes an "implicit finding" of confidence that a waste disposal
facility will be available when needed. It asserts that this informal judgment of confidence provides ample justification for the
therapy utilization facilities subject to regulation necessary to protect health and
safety); § 2134(c) (licenses for utilization facilities used in research subject to regulations to protect public health and safety); § 2164 (international cooperation and disclosure of data on health and safety issues authorized).
92. Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union, 367 U.S. 396, 406-407
(1961).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(b) (1976).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1976).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1976).
96. The NRC's regulations require each applicant to submit information concerning the production, onsite storage, onsite packaging and shipment offsite of radioactive waste. 10 C.F.R. 88 50.34(b)(2)(i) (1978); 50.34(b)(3) (1978); 50.34a(a) (1978);
50.34a(c)(1) (1978). No information concerning ultimate disposal is solicited or considered.
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continued licensing of nuclear reactors. 7
On its face, the NRC's refusal to make an explicit public
finding of the safety of waste disposal would appear to violate
the requirement of the AEA that a definitive, unqualified finding of safety be made in licensing reactors. Moreover, the
agency's reliance on an "implicit" finding of safety runs
counter to basic precepts of adninistrative law requiring explicit findings on all issues material to the agency's decision."
Finally, by analogy, the principles of agency decisionmaking
established in judicial interpretations of other environmental
protection laws would appear to require public consideration of
permanent waste disposal in reactor licensing. For example, it
has been firmly established under NEPA that an agency must
consider the indirect or second order effects of the immediate
projects proposed, and must abjure any limitation of perspective to the immediate boundaries or site of a project. 9 Also, in
several cases decided under NEPA, the courts have held the
effects of radioactive wastes or the use of potentially hazardous
nuclear technologies must be assessed fully before facilities
employing these technologies are licensed by the NRC."5 The
reasoning of these cases would logically dictate that the safety
of ultimate waste disposal be fully considered within the reactor licensing process.
There is no express enactment of Congress to support the
asserted exemption of this matter from the broad directive in
the AEA to protect public health and safety. The NRC's interpretation of its mandate rests almost entirely on its belief that
Congress has given tacit approval to the agency's contrary
practice, subsequent to the passage of the AEA.'11 The agency
points to statements made by its officials in Congressional sub97. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,391 (1977).
98. International Union v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1978); International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651-652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
99. Greene County Planning Bd. v. F.P.C., 455 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Sierra Club v. Coleman, 421 F.Supp. 63,67 (D.D.C. 1976).
100. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 539 F.2d 824, 841 (2d Cir.
1976); Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1089 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
101. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,391, 34,392-34,393 (1977).
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committee hearings that no solution to ultimate waste disposal
had been found yet and that no permanent waste repository
was available yet. From Congress' failure to halt nuclear reactor licensing in the face of such representations, the NRC deduces a Congressional sanction of its practice of exempting the
question of safe waste disposal from its reactor safety review.",'
In cases which have previously considered similar arguments, however, the courts have consistently refused to find
tacit legislative approval of an agency's interpretation or practice, absent a showing of explicit Congressional knowledge of
particular agency interpretation or practice.": In this instance,
the NRC is unable to point to any evidence that Congress was
ever made aware that the NRC had dispensed with any written, express determination of the feasibility of safe, permanent
waste storage in licensing the reactors which generate that
waste.
The NRC further justifies the exclusion of waste disposal
safety from its reactor safety review on the grounds that the
agency in licensing a permanent waste repository pursuant to
section 202 of the ERA' will make such a finding. In the
NRC's view, the requisite safety review merely has been deferred, not eliminated. It appears, however, that due to the
timing and the scope of the section 202 safety finding, the
character of such a review will be markedly different from a
safety review undertaken in the reactor licensing context. The
section 202 finding will be made after wastes requiring disposal
have been generated and will focus on the adequacy of a specific disposal site. This review will insure that no license will
issue for an inadequate repository, but will give no assurance
that a safe disposal site will ever be developed.
The NRC denied a petition filed by the Natural Resources
Defense Council to obtain such a definitive safety finding, and
a petition for review of that decision was filed in the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. The suit asked that the NRC
be required to hold an administrative proceeding to determine,
prior to the issuance of reactor licenses, whether a reasonable
assurance exists that radioactive wastes can be disposed of
102.
103.
98 S. Ct.
104.
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safely. The briefs filed in the case emphasized that such a
finding would not necessitate a showing that a permanent
waste facility was in actual operation. Rather, reasonable assurance could be based on a definitive finding that at a minimum: (1) technology exists for safe permanent disposal although it need not be in place now; (2) the appropriate technology will be fully implemented; and (3) reactor licenses are conditioned on the establishment of and compliance with appropriate deadlines for the development of safe waste disposal
facilities. The court of appeals accepted the NRC's argument
and denied the petition. 05 The court's decision thus allows the
NRC to avoid a formal, focused review of this technical safety
question, and fosters a major regulatory flaw in the licensing
of nuclear power reactors.
E. The Licensing of a Permanent Waste Repository
The urgency for the development of a permanent waste
repository increases as interim storage facilities fill to capacity,
but the licensing process to be applied to such a facility is
clouded with uncertainty. Section 202 of the ERA provides the
only explicit statutory authority for the NRC to license a DOE
waste management facility. 06 Subsection (3) of section 202
deals specifically with commercially generated wastes and requires an NRC license for waste facilities used primarily "for
the receipt and storage of high-level radioactive wastes resulting from activities licensed under such Act [AEA]."' '
A narrow construction of section 202 would leave a major
loophole in the NRC's licensing jurisdiction over an ultimate
waste repository for commercial waste. 0 The statute speaks in
105. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, No. 77-4157 (2d Cir. July
5, 1978), petition for rehearing denied (September 26, 1978).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 5842 (1976).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 5842(3) (1976).
108. There are also serious gaps in the regulatory system for licensing a repository
for military wastes. Subsection (4) of section 202 of the ERA requires an NRC license
for "facilities authorized for the express purpose of subsequent long-term storage of
high-level radioactive waste generated" by the DOE which are not part of "research
and development activities." 42 U.S.C. § 5842(4) (1976). In the past, the NRC has
taken the position that storage of more than twenty years is long-term. Oversight
Hearing Before'he Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 208 (May 16, 17, & 20, 1977) (testimony of
Dr. Clifford V. Smith, Jr.). Since current plans call for emplacement of militarygenerated wastes on a retrievable basis, it may be argued that Water Isolation Pilot
Plant (WIPP) would not constitute a long-term storage facility pending a decision to
leave the wastes there permanently. Moreover, since WIPP is to be the first actual

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

terms of "high-level" radioactive waste. If this term is construed according to the "official" definition of "high-level"
wastes, 109 spent fuel rods and transuranic contaminated wastes,
which do not fall under this narrow definition, would be excluded from the licensing requirements.10 This sort of restrictive interpretation of the NRC's licensing authority makes no
practical sense. At the time the definition of "high-level" waste
was developed, federal policy contemplated the reprocessing of
spent fuel so that the fission products, along with transuranic
nuclides, would be separated from usable uranium and plutonium. NRC regulations therefore defined "high-level" waste as
those highly radioactive liquids resulting from the separation
process, or their equivalent. The regulations further required
that such high-level wastes be solidified and sent to a federal
repository. Now, however, with the indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing,"' spent fuel will be the ultimate waste
form requiring disposal.
As a practical matter it no longer makes sense to differentiate the regulatory treatment of high-level wastes, spent fuel
rods, and transuranic contaminated wastes. These wastes have
similar properties and pose similar hazards, and thus require
similar levels of public protection. Moreover, it is the NRC's
responsibility under the AEA and the ERA to ensure that potentially hazardous products resulting from the continued development of nuclear energy should be subject to the separate
scrutiny of an independent regulatory agency. A narrow approach to the NRC's licensing authority over permanent waste
repositories, therefore, would undercut the fundamental purposes of the regulatory structure established by those acts.
The NRC has recognized the desirability of subjecting a
commercial waste repository to the licensing process and has
taken the position that section 202 of the ERA as currently
operating repository and DOE will be "experimenting" with the waste disposal techniques, it may be argued that the "research and development" exemption is available.
109. 10 C.F.R. § 50 app. F (1978).
110. Indeed, certain electric utilities raised this very question in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, No. 77-4157 (2d Cir. July 5, 1978), petition for
rehearingfiled, denied (September 26, 1978), the case which soughta definitive safety
finding on waste disposal from the NRC. See text accompanying notes 104-105 supra,
Brief for Intervenors Power Authority of the State of New York, et al. at 4 (January
13, 1978).
111. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
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drafted can be read appropriately to vest the agency with the
authority to license the receipt of both high-level waste and
spent fuel in such a facility."' Both the NRC and DOE have
recognized, however, that NRC licensing jurisdiction over ultimate disposal of commercial transuranic wastes under the existing legislation is uncertain. The recent special DOE task
force urged that legislative changes be sought to close this regulatory failing.13 In response, several bills have been introduced
in Congress to remove the potential licensing gaps in section
202 of the ERA as currently drafted and to make explicit NRC
licensing jurisdiction over commercial repositories for highlevel wastes, spent fuel rods, and transuranic wastes."'
Because plans to develop a facility to house commercial
wastes exclusively have lagged seriously behind schedule,"1 5 the
DOE is now considering combining military-generated wastes
and some commercial wastes in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP), the most recent proposal by the federal government
for a deep salt bed geologic repository. This project is slated for
development near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Although the facility
was planned initially for the disposal of military transuranic
wastes only, the most recently announced WIPP "mission"
envisions that the facility will provide for: (1) the permanent
disposal of defense-generated transuranic waste; (2) experimental studies conducted with military high-level wastes; and
(3) possibly up to 1,000 commercial spent fuel assemblies.
Under current plans, all of these various types of wastes would
be stored in a retrievable manner, until it is determined that
they may be allowed to remain safely in WIPP in perpetuity. I"
If DOE holds true to this agenda and to the position that
existing NRC licensing authority applies to spent fuel rods as
well as high-level wastes, at a minimum that portion of the
facility engineered for commercial waste disposal would be
subjected to NRC review. The narrow wording of the NRC's
statutory jurisdiction over waste repositories, however, raises
doubts about the breadth of the NRC's mandate. For instance,
112. Testimony of Dr. Clifford V. Smith, Jr., supra note 108 at 212.
113. See DEUTCH REPORT, supra note 18, at 6.
114. H.R. 9190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). S. 2804,95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978).
S. 3146, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978).
115. See text accompanying notes 30-41 supra.
116. 43 Fed. Reg. 30,331 (1978).
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licensing consideration of the disposal of spent fuel may be
avoided. There is uncertainty, furthermore, whether commercial transuranic wastes buried at WIPP (if the scope of that
facility is expanded) or at another repository for commercial
wastes would come under licensing review. Despite their tremendous importance, permanent waste disposal facilities may
slide through a regulatory gap and be subject to inadequate
licensing review unless these uncertainties in the regulatory
structure are removed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Serious flaws pervade the regulatory system for the management and disposal of radioactive waste. These deficiencies
are due in part to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's failure
to exercise fully its clear statutory authority and in part to
uncertainty concerning the scope of that authority. Initial advances have been made recently in rectifying deficiencies in the
regulation of uranium mill tailings. The closing of remaining
regulatory loopholes through more vigorous agency action, perhaps accompanied by more explicit authorizing legislation, is
essential to ensure adequate protection of public health and
safety against the hazards of the nuclear industry.

